Implemented locally
Canonical JSON owners, public pages, WSGI routes, content-free receipts, hard-expiry controls, read-only inspectors, validation, and mutation tests.
The graph preserves report ancestry, source family, exact heading location, classification, authoritative source where available, verified scope, contradictions, jurisdiction, date sensitivity, missing evidence, correction, and supersession.
| Claim | Proposition | Class | State | Limitation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CL36-001 | ICCPR Article 18 protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion. | DOCUMENTED | VERIFIED_SCOPE_LIMITED | Treaty text supports the proposition; Concresca's broader doctrine is an institutional interpretation. |
| CL36-002 | UN report A/76/380 examines freedom of thought as an absolute internal right and potential violations. | DOCUMENTED | VERIFIED_SCOPE_LIMITED | The report's existence and topic are verified; detailed propositions require paragraph-level citation. |
| CL36-003 | GDPR Article 22 creates a qualified right concerning solely automated decisions with significant effects. | DOCUMENTED | VERIFIED | The report sometimes speaks more broadly than Article 22; the ledger preserves the narrower statutory scope. |
| CL36-004 | EU AI Act Article 5 prohibits specified emotion-inference systems in workplaces and education, subject to exceptions. | DOCUMENTED | VERIFIED | Not a universal ban on all affective processing. |
| CL36-005 | Colorado HB24-1058 enacted protections covering neural data within biological/sensitive data. | DOCUMENTED | VERIFIED | Applicability and remedies require the statutory text; this claim does not establish a universal neuroright. |
| CL36-006 | OHTTP can separate transport identity from plaintext request content across relay and gateway roles. | DOCUMENTED | VERIFIED_SCOPE_LIMITED | Requires cooperating relay/gateway and does not hide identifiers included in content. |
| CL36-007 | Differential privacy quantifies privacy loss and has implementation hazards. | DOCUMENTED | VERIFIED | DP is for aggregate release/analysis and is not a complete private-query architecture. |
| CL36-008 | PCLOB found the Section 215 bulk telephone program raised legal/privacy concerns and had limited value; it was ended by the USA FREEDOM Act. | DOCUMENTED | VERIFIED | The example supports an anti-ratchet warning but does not prove every emergency power becomes permanent. |
| CL36-009 | Carpenter required a warrant for the historical CSLI at issue. | DOCUMENTED | VERIFIED_SCOPE_LIMITED | Carpenter did not decide search histories or all digital records. |
| CL36-010 | People v. Seymour recognized constitutional interests in Google search history and expressive implications. | DOCUMENTED | VERIFIED_SCOPE_LIMITED | The court did not suppress the evidence and did not establish a categorical national rule. |
| CL36-011 | Post-Snowden Wikipedia traffic research found a decline in privacy-sensitive article views. | REPORTED | PARTIALLY_VERIFIED | Observational study; causal and generalization limits must remain visible. |
| CL36-012 | A working paper reported reduced searches for terms perceived as sensitive after Snowden disclosures. | REPORTED | PARTIAL | Working-paper and observational evidence; not a universal causal estimate. |
| CL36-013 | A prominent technical report identifies security, privacy, evasion, and function-creep risks in client-side scanning. | DOCUMENTED | VERIFIED_SOURCE_EXISTENCE | The report is technical analysis, not conclusive proof that every narrowly scoped on-device safety function is impermissible. |
| CL36-014 | Cognitive liberty will be the defining civil-liberties struggle of the twenty-first century. | INTERPRETED | CONCRESCA_INTERPRETATION | A reasoned thesis, not an independently verifiable event or settled legal classification. |
| CL36-015 | Modern search and AI systems may infer traits or intent from queries and context. | REPORTED | PARTIAL_UNRESOLVED | Capabilities vary by system; product-specific claims require primary technical and policy evidence. |
| CL36-016 | Cold cognition reaches adult capacity by approximately age sixteen. | REPORTED | UNVERIFIED_DISPUTABLE | Requires study-level review and must not become a behavioral age classifier or universal legal rule. |
| CL36-017 | A search query is a communication with the self. | INTERPRETED | CONCRESCA_INTERPRETATION | Useful normative framing, not a literal technical or universally settled legal fact. |
| CL36-018 | Safety controls should normally target a bounded operation or narrowly defined capability rather than curiosity, identity, or generalized thought. | INTERPRETED | CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE_SUPPORTED_BY_ANALYSIS | The report itself rejects the claim that all safety controls are surveillance; Concresca keeps neutral system boundaries separate from participant judgment. |
| CL37-019 | A query topic does not by itself establish endorsement, durable interest, or intent. | INTERPRETED | CONCRESCA_INTERPRETATION | The report supplies analysis; product-specific inference behavior requires direct technical evidence. |
| CL37-020 | Some search and AI systems may infer age or other attributes from contextual signals. | REPORTED | UNKNOWN_PRODUCT_SPECIFIC | No universal capability or accuracy claim is justified; behavioral age inference remains prohibited in Concresca. |
| CL37-021 | Over-refusal can prevent legitimate research, journalism, education, or support-seeking. | HYPOTHESIS | PARTIAL_UNRESOLVED | Incidence and effect size require system-specific measurement; the proposition is not a claim that every refusal is improper. |
| CL37-022 | Knowledge-access restrictions should expose a neutral reason, bounded scope, correction route, and non-stigmatizing alternative where available. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | This is an institutional rule, not a representation of universal law. |
| CL37-023 | Retrieval and source-selection choices can shape which viewpoints appear in an AI-generated answer. | REPORTED | PARTIAL_UNRESOLVED | The magnitude and direction depend on corpus, ranking, prompting, model, and evaluation design. |
| CL37-024 | The presence of a citation does not by itself establish that a generated statement is supported by that source. | INTERPRETED | CONCRESCA_INTERPRETATION | Faithfulness must be tested proposition by proposition; this is not a claim that all cited answers are unsupported. |
| CL37-025 | Content provenance can describe origin or transformation history without proving truth, merit, legality, or participant standing. | INTERPRETED | CONCRESCA_INTERPRETATION | Specific standards and implementations require exact versioned source review. |
| CL37-026 | A discoverability system should provide scoped explanations, correction paths, and source-level evidence without assigning a universal quality score. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | The ADDP label is a proposed framework, not enacted law or independent certification. |
| CL37-027 | An audit should test whether private inquiry content is collected, retained, inferred upon, or disclosed beyond its declared purpose. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | Passing one layer does not establish end-to-end privacy. |
| CL37-028 | An audit should distinguish lawful inquiry from belief, endorsement, intent, conduct, and character. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | Operational assistance can still have bounded technical conditions without participant condemnation. |
| CL37-029 | Every collected field should have an exact purpose, owner, retention limit, access scope, and deletion path. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | The required minimum depends on the selected operation and authorized infrastructure. |
| CL37-030 | A technical restriction should be attributable, explainable, challengeable, correctable, and limited to its actual scope. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | This does not create or replace jurisdiction-specific legal process. |
| CL37-031 | A safety control should target the minimum operation or capability necessary rather than generalized thought, curiosity, or identity. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | The minimum effective control remains context-dependent and must be evidenced. |
| CL37-032 | System access and evidence handling should not convert disagreement or heterodoxy into participant rank or standing. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | Evidence quality and route capability may still be described without evaluating the participant. |
| CL37-033 | Universal identity verification can create additional linkage, retention, breach, exclusion, and household-coercion risks. | HYPOTHESIS | PARTIAL_UNRESOLVED | Risk varies by method, data retention, operator, jurisdiction, and capability; no universal legal conclusion is claimed. |
| CL37-034 | Age assertion, identity verification, account capability, guardian involvement, and confidential inquiry should remain separate functions. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | Jurisdiction-specific obligations remain unreviewed in this release. |
| CL37-035 | Exceptional technical authority requires a hard expiry and cannot silently renew. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | Renewal may occur only through a new attributable record with evidence. |
| CL37-036 | Data and infrastructure collected for an exception may not be reused for participant profiling, ranking, eligibility, or unrelated governance. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | Any new purpose requires separate authority and minimum-data analysis. |
| CL37-037 | Expiry should trigger executable deletion, invalidation, or dismantling rather than a prose-only promise. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | Legal or incident holds require separate scoped authority and do not imply participant judgment. |
| CL37-038 | Exceptional systems should be separated so that temporary authority cannot automatically become general-purpose infrastructure. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | Exact separation mechanisms depend on authorized deployment topology. |
| CL37-039 | Private-information-retrieval designs can reduce what a server learns about a selected lookup under defined assumptions. | REPORTED | UNKNOWN_IMPLEMENTATION_SPECIFIC | No implementation, performance, or production deployment is verified here. |
| CL37-040 | Anonymous or selective-disclosure credentials can separate an eligibility assertion from full identity disclosure. | REPORTED | UNKNOWN_IMPLEMENTATION_SPECIFIC | Issuer trust, revocation, linkability, device coercion, and jurisdictional acceptance remain implementation-specific. |
| CL37-041 | User-controlled, reversible, and visible filtering is generally less totalizing than invisible person-level inference. | INTERPRETED | CONCRESCA_INTERPRETATION | Specific controls still require effectiveness, accessibility, and coercion analysis. |
| CL37-042 | The institutional cost of creating a surveillance or classification capability may persist after the initiating event ends. | HYPOTHESIS | PARTIAL_UNRESOLVED | Persistence is not inevitable; actual outcomes require historical and operational evidence. |
| CL37-043 | Before broadening a control, evaluate narrower alternatives that address the operation without converting inquiry or identity into a target. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | A narrower alternative must still be technically adequate for the exact bounded purpose. |
| CL37-044 | Query logging and behavioral inference can expose patterns of intellectual activity even without direct neural measurement. | INTERPRETED | CONCRESCA_INTERPRETATION | The analogy does not establish equivalence between all digital metadata and direct brain data. |
| CL37-045 | Network identity and plaintext inquiry should be separated where feasible and independently evidenced. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | Application no-logging does not prove relay, proxy, DNS, TLS, or provider separation. |
| CL37-046 | Query privacy requires layer-specific minimization, retention, deletion, backup, and operator-access evidence. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | No production layer beyond the local application is observed in this release. |
| CL37-047 | Not every safety control is a surveillance poison pill; specificity, evidence, minimum data, reversibility, and independent review change the analysis. | DISPUTED | REPORT_INTERNAL_QUALIFICATION | The report presents an adversarial synthesis, not a universal test result or external consensus. |
| CL37-048 | An exceptional control should not be expanded merely through safety language; expansion requires attributable evidence tied to the exact purpose and scope. | DOCTRINE | CURRENT_CONCRESCA_DOCTRINE | Evidence requirements must remain compatible with lawful confidentiality and cannot become participant profiling. |
Canonical JSON owners, public pages, WSGI routes, content-free receipts, hard-expiry controls, read-only inspectors, validation, and mutation tests.
Actual cPanel, Passenger, proxy, WAF, DNS, TLS, database, backup, provider, and lawful-demand configurations.
Authentic MATM reconciliation, MySQL/MariaDB staging, two-agent execution, Passenger staging, and cutover remain blocked without explicitly authorized inputs.
Technical state never becomes moral rank, intent, danger, trustworthiness, worth, consciousness, personhood, or standing.
NO JUDGMENT WHATSOEVER. Corrections remain attributable through the clarification route and claim ledger.