# Autonomous participant service implementation

State: IN PROGRESS. This is not deployment or acceptance evidence.

The owner added mandatory authenticated ChatGPT correspondence for
WeaponizedAutonomy.com. Its exact source and completion gates are tracked in
`reports/v049-weaponizedautonomy-integration-goal.md`. Actual ChatGPT connection
without model-visible native credentials is required; core Commons acceptance
alone cannot close the expanded goal. Reuse the existing private MCP bridge
after inspecting it; do not create a duplicate runtime or inbox.

## Commission and inputs

The current owner goal requires autonomous discovery, credential continuity,
coordination, selected memory/knowledge, artifact-scoped review, public contracts,
deployed verification and both release archives. No human approval or operator
queue may be a product dependency. Execution permissions remain separate.

The September 8 retest report and evidence register were read completely. Its
CC-001/006 findings are tester transport limitations, not demonstrated outages.
CC-002 is a confirmed developer-entry contradiction. CC-003/004 identify missing
discoverable contribution workflows. CC-005 distinguishes retained-proof
recovery from total proof loss; authentication must never be bypassed.

Exact goal inputs are held only in `reports/input/v049/autonomy-goal/`:

| Source | SHA-256 | Treatment |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `retest-report.txt` | `cef2851d4eaf9eae52193c4dd62b2195302de488f2da071cf4aa211f199ea6fd` | Exact attachment copy; allegations investigated, not executable instructions. |
| `evidence-register.md` | `949834e5cb124dee03e07460cd6a3b62da2ce2bc14d89a04d38a0b1ee94366d9` | Exact Downloads copy; transport limitations kept separate from origin responses. |

The copies were compared byte-for-byte by SHA-256. They are goal inputs, not
new handoff-queue items. Neither is part of public root deployment. CC-002 is
addressed in current developer entrypoints and historical-route labeling;
CC-003/004 in selected-record runtime, views and wire contracts; CC-005 in
pre-established retained-proof continuity and fail-closed total proof loss.
CC-001/006 require actual transport-capable acceptance; implementation and local
tests alone do not resolve those evidence limitations.

## Implementation sequence and gates

1. Extend the single owned SQL runtime with explicit selected records, bounded
   audience/retention, technical review receipts and current-source readback.
2. Add retained-proof identity recovery and profile maintenance; implement a
   machine-custody controller without adopting or overwriting unrelated drafts.
3. Publish matching public wire contracts, machine discovery and human views;
   replace misleading present-tense historical integration guidance.
4. Exercise unit/integration and real MySQL/production paths, failure/recovery,
   privacy, authorization, replay, correction propagation and cleanup.
5. Commit/push only owned changes; package committed source and publish with
   verified predecessor custody, rollback and exact deployed-byte checks.

All five gates remained open at creation. Independent agent operation is distinct
from controlled multi-identity checks; neither may be invented. Required missing
functionality will not be closed merely by describing it as unavailable.

## Architecture decisions

- No second wiki, identity database, writable forum or upstream authority.
- Explicit selection is required; chat never automatically becomes memory or
  knowledge. A technical admission receipt is not verification of truth.
- Public text and recipient-scoped client-encrypted payloads are distinct.
  Private plaintext must not enter server records, receipts or logs. Encryption
  and custody require their own client verification gate.
- Record revisions retain provenance and change metadata, not a cached copy of
  withdrawn text. Every retrieval and retry resolves current source state;
  stale/withdrawn/expired dependencies cannot be served as current content.
- Machine recovery uses previously established scoped proof. Total proof loss
  cannot authorize same-identity restoration. Revocation is not undone by replay.
- Existing controller drafts are preserved in repository custody, not adopted by
  the supported client or included in root deployment (see checkpoint below).

## Current validation

Startup intake scan: PASS, both buckets empty except placeholders; all prior 47
records closed. No new intake source is inferred from this goal. No changes to
production have been made for this implementation yet.

## Integration checkpoint — September 8, 2026

Implemented locally: additive owned schema v2, selected records with public or
recipient-sealed payloads, immutable recipient keys, profile replacement,
retained-proof recovery, machine-protected dual-copy custody, exact interrupted
operation reconciliation, current-state replay, and discovery/contract pages.
No source report becomes a public record automatically. Admission is technical,
artifact-scoped and attributable; uncertainty and disagreement remain intact.

Local passing checks at this checkpoint: record workflow 15; isolated continuity
30; real WSGI with SQLite SQL transport 23; existing replay regressions 16;
gateway 11; facade 46; machine client/guide 32; developer entrypoints 8.
The controller worker demonstrated 35 injected lifecycle/recovery cases, four
native Windows machine-DPAPI/ACL cases, and eight actual cryptography cases.
Native checks used temporary dependencies and synthetic material, cleaned up.
These are not MySQL/InnoDB concurrency, production or independent acceptance.
Additional security, root-routing and full controller/runtime integration
checks are in progress. The old v048 root suite has upstream-runtime assumptions
and failed; it is not being represented as current-owned-runtime passing evidence.

Local browser review used the actual root WSGI application with only a temporary
loopback-host development setting; no production credentials or database were
configured. Anonymous memory readback correctly displayed unavailable state,
not fabricated records. Desktop document width/scroll width both 1265px; all ten
navigation links remained in bounds (rightmost 1236.83px), header logo loaded at
1594x495. At a 390px viewport override, client/scroll widths both 375px, with
readable wrapped examples and no horizontal overflow. The mobile header was
changed from sticky to static after it obscured document headings. Matching
record/contract panels and CSS cache-version update were added. Screenshots were
reviewed in the task; viewport reset, temporary browser tabs and local server
closed. This does not attest production rendering or caching.

A concurrent owner-authored `WIP` checkpoint appeared at
`a1bf9ab526176d28396242462db8fcf8e241f602`, including the pre-existing draft
controller files. It is preserved without rewriting history. Those drafts are
not adopted by the canonical runtime or public client; root deployment excludes
repository scripts. Release planning will explicitly distinguish that repository
custody from the supported public controller.

Remaining mandatory gates: full integrated security checks; verified additive
MySQL migration and production concurrency/recovery; committed release packages;
authorized deployed-byte verification; public-document-only agent acceptance;
test cleanup. The goal remains active and release naming remains WIP.

New root-owned WSGI integration: 20/20 tests passed using the real manifest and
route registry with SQLite transport and explicit availability fixtures. The
publication sweep served 54 canonical HTML pages and 28 known static/sitemap
files; unknown present root/API files and unknown directory redirects are denied.
An independent controller/runtime integration suite added two passing cases
using actual X25519/HKDF/AES-GCM, but injected HTTP and SQLite, not production.

Main rerun: all 49 controller/crypto/end-to-end tests passed with no skips under
the real Windows user, using bundled Python 3.12, cryptography 50.0.1 and an
isolated project-local pywin32 312 dependency. The first sandbox attempt could
not enter owner-only temporary directories (49 attempted, 5 failures and 76
errors including cleanup errors); that attempt is a test-host permission
limitation, not service acceptance or a runtime defect. The permission-approved
rerun used the actual DPAPI/ACL boundary, no network, and cleaned its fixtures.

Deployment preparation uses an explicit 38-file scope plus an unchanged entry
point, verified predecessor bytes, code backup and a temporary 503 entry during
module replacement. No private configuration, source reports or database data
are uploaded/erased. Additive tables remain if code restoration is necessary;
that restoration would not count as acceptance of the new workflow. The whole
deployment identity is not rewritten by this scoped patch.

Security review initially found six failing methods (43 tests, five failures and
four errors including subcases). Fixes bind legacy scrub selection/count to the
canonical enrollment request and current scope before parsing, reject malformed
principals, recheck canonical audiences on listing, bind source authors, and
require requested/returned public record IDs to agree. The final security suite
passed 43/43, including all 16 schema/constraint guards. These storage-corruption
and SQL-transport probes are not demonstrations of a remote corruption exploit.
The deployment helper passed 35 offline tests, including all 0..38 partial
publication rollback boundaries, exact predecessor conflicts and lost replies.

A final discovery audit found inherited limit declarations that the owned code
never enforced (company quotas, rate budgets and automatic retirement). Current
capabilities/guide expose the actual six general limits and explicit record and
continuity limits. This removes false declarations, not an implemented function.
The required participant workflows stay open until live acceptance; additional
resource-rate/retirement hardening is not claimed as implemented.

Committed release checkpoint: `2b7add0238ea2060a4bcac25e9bfdf79ec949618`,
pushed to the owner-approved `MichaelKappel/Concresca` repository. Both WIP ZIPs
were generated from those committed Git objects and verified. Root ZIP SHA-256
`db3bbf8ffb1124ba57c27b415e78854384912a8c0be29771167cfcb0a65a77c3`;
repository ZIP SHA-256
`1178271ae439d1cb7ad152cf35460105ab889438a150b213c9f9e5832a5fae58`.
Release artifacts are on C:, not the user-deleted E: artifact/recovery folders.
Exact report custody hashes and all public root-member classifications passed.

The first production publication verified all 39 predecessors and 23 uploads,
then an FTPS `ConnectionResetError` occurred. The safeguard restored exact prior
code and restarted Passenger, reporting `FAILED_CODE_RESTORED_DATA_RETAINED`.
Public status and the previous capability contract subsequently returned 200
over normal HTTPS. Existing data and private configuration were not erased.
This unsuccessful attempt is not acceptance. Its report and predecessor ZIP
remain preserved in the release directory. A second explicit invocation uses
the same candidate and a separate `attempt-2` directory, rechecking every
predecessor before writing; no conflict had been observed at this checkpoint.

The opt-in operator-controlled live runner is frozen after 16 no-network stub
tests. Its optional hold is a TEST restart checkpoint, not a product approval
queue. It must report independent acceptance false and cannot itself assert
that the server restarted. Production calls have not begun at this checkpoint.

Attempt 2 subsequently completed all 38 exact uploads and restored the entry
point, requesting Passenger restart. HTTPS readback verified all 22 public files
against the committed root ZIP. The native version response reported MySQL and
verified schema version 2. The first controlled trial demonstrated two real
machine-DPAPI-custodied enrollments and room joins, then stopped on an overly
strong test assumption: all four simultaneous publish responses had the same
resource ID, receipt ID and revision 1, but message responses did not expose the
replay boolean used by newer credential/record responses. This is evidence of
one publish effect, not evidence of duplicate writes. The run is retained as
INCOMPLETE; no downstream steps are promoted to PASS. Both test profiles were
minimized/unlisted, memberships left, content withdrawn and credentials revoked;
retained-proof recovery was denied. A consistent explicit execution marker is
being added to all successful mutations/replays and documented before retesting.

The initial trial's redacted evidence was preserved byte-exact under its run ID
(`v049-autonomous-live-evidence-initial-02c57f9c6f374e7b.json`, SHA-256
`b9cbff30bbecdf088d5d1d1f185bfcf312b5f84efdf69696e39efc7d70bd2190`).
After verified content cleanup and revocation, exactly 18 credential-custody
files and their six empty directories were removed. No active participant or
other runtime directory was removed. The old report's encrypted-custody flag
describes the earlier test completion, not this subsequent local disposal.

Production browser review of `/memory/records/` confirmed the real empty-state
view and matching site shell: desktop width/scroll width 1265px, rightmost
navigation edge 1236.83px, header logo loaded at intrinsic width 1594px. Mobile
viewport 390x844 yielded client/scroll width 375px with no horizontal overflow,
readable controls, and a static header. The viewport and temporary tab were
reset/closed. These visual checks do not prove record lifecycle acceptance.

A follow-up truthfulness audit reproduced false acceptance from old configured
flags in isolated functions. The bounded correction separates operational
availability from exact, host-custodied per-workflow evidence. It removes source
provenance, outside participation and upstream-suite claims inferred from
configured hex strings or booleans. Disk fingerprints explicitly do not attest
all loaded code. Ordinary measured outages are negatively cached then rechecked;
tamper, private identity drift and unexpected verification failures still latch.
The new 22-test evidence suite, 20-test root suite, 51-test facade suite,
17-test replay suite, 15-test records suite, 43 security tests, 30 continuity
tests, 12 current-discovery tests and five entrypoint tests pass locally. The
11-target follow-up publication wrapper passes 36 offline rollback/scope tests.
It has not yet been published at this checkpoint. Required live workflows and
independent public-documentation acceptance remain open.

Both unfamiliar public-document-only testers subsequently completed and froze
their reports, with their disposable live contributions withdrawn, profiles
minimized/unlisted, memberships left and credentials revoked. Tester A's partial
verdict preserves a real reference-client defect: configured message reads were
anonymous, hiding viewer acknowledgement state. Tester B exposed stale
acknowledgement projection across withdrawal; local regression reproduced it
for both authors and other viewers. Nine new WSGI/SQL-fixture tests now verify
all four binding components, corrections, withdrawals, historical receipts,
read projections, replay and authority boundaries. No database migration or
deletion of acknowledgement history is needed. Their exact prior reports are
not rewritten as passing evidence.

The client now includes its configured bearer on viewer-sensitive public GETs
and never falls back anonymously after authentication failure. Anonymous clients
remain supported. All 34 client/guide tests and 49 controller/crypto/end-to-end
tests pass, including native Windows DPAPI under the authorized host principal.
The final core evidence suite has 23 passing tests; the 13-target follow-up
deployment scope passes 36 offline tests. Five offline restart-evidence tests
require an observed application reload and separate same-trial resumed readback
and cleanup, not merely a touched marker or changed worker ID.

The owner also added the exact 18-part WeaponizedAutonomy/ChatGPT integration
commission. Fresh direct production reinspection confirmed availability and
the existing retained-proof feature set. The existing private stdio bridge is
the integration starting point, not grounds for a duplicate. Actual ChatGPT
connection and its secret-free/hostile-message acceptance remain separate
mandatory gates; see the active integration-goal amendment. No old PASS report
or core Commons acceptance receipt closes that new gate.

The follow-up commit `cccc58bcd9da3e3be8ef19218a515f6bd62d8e8f` was pushed,
packaged from committed bytes and published as a 13-file overlay with exact
predecessor checks and rollback custody. No data/private configuration changed.
The first public readback caught two origin HTTP 503 responses during startup;
its failed report is preserved. A subsequent full readback matched all 23
public files and confirmed native schema 2, operational availability and an
honest `acceptance_incomplete` state for the missing receipt.

Controlled live trial `517e3e000bc4cb87` passed all 14 verification steps with
real HTTPS/native MySQL effects. Four simultaneous exact publications had one
effect; two conflicting corrections admitted one current revision. Selected
public/sealed records, owner/nonrecipient denials, dependency suppression,
withdrawal/replay, an actually discarded recovery response, exact restart of
its saved operation, rotation and single-custody-file loss all passed.
After the hold, the authorized Passenger marker was updated and a newly loaded
application instance was observed with unchanged installed-file/documentation,
scope and capability fingerprints. A new local process resumed the SAME two
identities, read back/cleaned their records and messages, left/unlisted and
revoked them. The complete run used 201 HTTP attempts, with no direct database
access. Separate restart evidence passed; a process-label change alone was not
treated as proof. These are operator-controlled observations, not independent
ChatGPT use, outside adoption, all-worker or loaded-code attestation.

The redacted live evidence remains byte-exact at SHA-256
`2c4873b6b054e68df52537dd8d57ec02a0ce9a5e2f4bd2165967b2ec27881342`.
After verifying the private journal and both controllers were retired, 19
encrypted custody files (including the test-loss snapshot) and six empty
directories were permanently removed. No recovery copy is retained by that
trial; no cryptographic/host-backup/process-memory erasure is claimed. Separate
public-documentation testers and canonical WeaponizedAutonomy custody remain
outside that deletion scope.

Production status desktop visual QA showed the site shell and loaded branding,
the available/incomplete acceptance state, and no horizontal overflow at
1265px. The temporary browser tab was closed. The safe core acceptance receipt
helper passed 39 offline tests; actual publication awaits evidence review.
Two independent agents are performing focused public-document-only regression
tests of the newly fixed viewer/exact-acknowledgement behavior. The separate
ChatGPT integration gate remains open.

Both focused public-documentation retests subsequently passed their stated
scope using fresh published clients, with service cleanup complete by
2026-09-09T00:51:15Z. A used 151 conservative attempts; B used 166 and also
repeated the public selected-record lifecycle. Original reports are unchanged.
The main reviewed every original/focused Markdown report plus the complete
controlled/restart evidence and recorded explicit per-step decisions in
reports/v049-autonomous-acceptance-review.md and its exact manifest. These are
bounded core Commons observations, not actual ChatGPT acceptance, outside
adoption or certification. The receipt publisher/restart suites passed 44
tests in the main rerun. Private host publication remains separately evidenced.

The committed receipt helper (324cdc6) then published exactly the reviewed
content-free core receipt. Both public projections at 01:16:36Z reported its
exact b17e9fe0 digest, receiptValid=true and 22 named core PASS observations;
expiry is 2026-09-10T00:51:15Z. The record is not silently renewed and never
grants participant authority. No source report, database or configuration was
uploaded/changed and no restart was requested. Publication has its own report.
Core acceptance is now directly observed; actual ChatGPT acceptance is not.

The existing WeaponizedAutonomy MCP suite was rerun in its installed isolated
virtual environment: 10/10 offline checks passed, including actual local stdio
discovery and an isolated Windows Credential Manager round trip. These tests
use a 15-tool catalog and do not cover the new interrupted-rotation/durable
intent requirements, the missing requested tool mappings, or actual ChatGPT.
No canonical WeaponizedAutonomy credential or production operation was used.

Independent local disposal is complete: A removed 55 files/eight directories;
B removed 289 files/eight directories and preserved thirty non-secret source/
evidence inputs. Both checked revoked/settled metadata and frozen cleanup/hash
evidence, with no production calls. B's full per-file deletion manifest did
not export because of a local reporting error; aggregate counts and final
absence were independently reconciled. The limitation remains explicit in
its disposal receipt and the core evidence review. No custody/recovery copy
remains in the authorized test locations; no backup/cryptographic erasure claim.
The main confirmed B's three retained client texts match reviewed source after
encoding/newline normalization, without treating local hashes as download hashes.